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I. Introduction
Risk averse workers facing uncertain employment prospects
prefer to insure against adverse economic conditions such as
unemployment. If they could, they would purchase private
unemployment insurance in order to finance consumption during
jobless spells. In fact, if the insurance were actuarially fair,
it is well known that the all risk averse workers would choose to
fully insure so that consumption during unemployment would exactly
equal consumption while employed. But, for a variety of reasons,
insurance markets are incomplete, and private unemployment
insurance cannot be purchased.
In the absence of private insurance markets, agents will try
and save during periods of employment and dissave during jobless
spells. It is unlikely, however, that workers would be able to
save enough to completely smooth consumption across periods of
employment and unemplo~ent. In response to this problem,
virtually every developed country provides public unemployment
insurance (UI). In the united states, there is considerable
empirical evidence that Ul does what it was intended to do -- it
allows workers to smooth consumption. For example, in a recent
paper, Gruber (1994) estimates that without UI consumption would
fall by 22% during unemployment, whereas it falls by only 7% with
UI in place.
But UI has unintended effects' as well. By now' there is
considerable evidence that Ul increases the length of unemployment
1
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spells .1 By providing unemployment insurance, the government
reduces the opportunity cost of unemployment. This reduces search
effort and increases both the length of unemployment spells and the
equilibrium rate of unemployment. 2 In designing an optimal U1
program, the positive and negative effects of U1 must be weighed
against one another.
There are two classic theoretical treatments of optimal U1 --
Baily (1978) and Flemming (1978). Both take the same approach,
considering the situation faced by a typical unemployed worker and
solving for optimal search effort as a function of UI. Although
the actual spell of unemployment is a random variable, its expected
value varies inversely with search effort. Both authors solve the
optimal insurance problem by choosing UI to maximize the expected
lifetime utility of the representative worker. The papers differ
in their treatments of leisure, savings, and the capital market.
Nevertheless, both papers and the empirical work making use of
their approach all seem to conclude that UI ,payments in the united
states are too generous (see, for example, Gruber 1994 and O'Leary
1994).
The purpose of this paper is to extend the analysis offered by
Baily and Flemmin9 in two ways. First, in formulating their
models, both authors assume that UI is offered indefinitely -- that
See Davidson and Woodbury (1995b) for a review and new
evidence based on the reemployment bonus experiments.
2 It is often argued, on the other hand, that UI makes workers
choosier about the jobs they accept, and that this may improve the
quality of job matches. This notion has persisted despite very
little empirical evidence in support of it.
2
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is, unemployed workers collectUI benefits in every period until
they find a job. But few UI systems are set up to pay benefits
indefinitely. In the United states, workers usually exhaust their
UI benefits after 26 weeks of unemployment. The potential duration
of benefits is longer in Canada -- where it is about 1 year -- and
in most of western Europe -- where it is 3 years or longer in
several countries, and~indefinite in Belgium (OECD 1991). Even in
the countries whereUI is offered for 3 years or longer, a
significant number of ·workers . remain unemployed long enough to
exhaust their benefits. In section III, we show that taking into
account the finite potential dur,-ation of benefits drastically
alters the conclusions reached by Baily and Flemming. For example,
Flemming finds that if lending and borrowing are ruled out, the
optimal replacement rate is approximately .75. The optimal
replacement rate is close to .75 in our model as well (it is
actually around two-thirds), assuming that UI is offered
indefinitely. However, if UI is offered for only 26 weeks, the
optimal replacement rate rises to 1.
Also in section III, we solve for the optimal UI program
assuming that it can' be characterized by two instruments --the
level of UI benefits (or the replacement rate) and the potential
duration of benefits. Surprisingly, we find that the optimal UI
program is characterized by an infinite potential duration of
benefits. The argument is as follows. Let x denote the level of
benefits and let T denote the potential duration of Ul. Suppose
that we compare twoUI programs (xll T1) and (x2 ,T2) with Xl > x2 and
3
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T1 < T2 so that the second program offers lower benefits but a
longer potential duration'of benefits. Suppose further that these
two programs cost taxpayers the same amount to fund so that
employed workers earn the same after-tax wage under the two
programs. We find that all risk-averse unemployed workers prefer
the second program in spite of the fact that benefits are lower.
They prefer the second program because the reduction in the
probability that they will exhaust their benefits more than offsets
the reduction in their benefits. In the terminology of decision
making under uncertainty, the second program is "less risky" than
the first program and is therefore preferred by all risk averse
agents. Since the optimal ur program offers workers benefits
indefinitely while most state programs in the united states offer
benefits for only 26 weeks, the model's results suggest that the
current united States system may not be generous enough.
The second extension we offer concerns the composition of the
pool of unemployed workers. Both Baily and Flemming assume that
all unemployed workers are eligible for UI benefits. In reality,
fewer than half of all unemployed workers in the united states are
UI-eligible (Blank and Card 1991). We show that this fact has
important implications for the optimal replacement rate. Briefly,
there are two effects. First, since an increase in UI benefits
reduces the search intensity ofUI-eligible workers, UI-ineligibles
gain as they face less competition for jobs. This positive spill-
over effect of ur increases the optimal replacement rate. The
second effect is more subtle and depends on the degree of
4
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SUbstitutability in production between Ur-eligible and ineligible
workers. Since Ur-ineligibles receive no ur benefits, they search
harder than UI-eligible workers. If these two types of workers are
close substitutes, then treating all workers as if they are UI-
eligibles will overstate the reemployment prospects for Ur-eligible
workers. In this case, the presence of UI-ineligibles in the
workforce increases the optimal replacement rate; that is, since
Ur-ineligibles make it harder for UI-eligibles to find
reemployment, the government needs to increase the level of
insurance it provides to UI-eligibles. On the other hand, if ur-
ineligibles tend to be lower-skilled workers who are poor
substitutes for ur-eligibl~ workers, then treating all workers as
if the were UI-eligible will understate the reemployment prospects
of Ur-eligible workers. In this case, the presence of UI-
ineligibles in the workforce lowers the optimal replacement rate
(i.e., less insurance is needed). When we combine the spill-over
effect and the effect of sUbstitutability between Ur-eligibles and
Ur-ineligibles, we find that unless the degree of sUbstitutability
between Ur-eligibles and UI-ineligibles is extremely low, the
presence of UI-ineligibles raises the optimal replacement rate.
In summary, . we emphasize the importance of extending the
models of Baily and Flemming to incorporate two empirical features
of the U1 system that UI benefits are offered only for a finite
length of time and that not all workers are eligible for UI
benefits. When their models are extended to include these
features, the optimal replacement rate rises.
5
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In fact, we find
that for reasonable parameter values, our model suggests that
average statutory UI benefits in the united states are too low and
that the potential duration of benefits is too short.
The paper is divided into three additional sections. In
section II, we introduce a model that is similar in spirit to those
of Baily and Flemming in that it assumes that all unemployed
workers are eligible for UI. However, our model differs from
theirs in that we allow for a finite potential duration of
benefits. using this model, we show in section III.A that any
program that eventually cuts off benefits is Pareto-Dominated by
another program that offers more periods of coverage. Thus, any
optimal program must include an infinite potential duration of
benefits. In section III.B, we solve for the optimal replacement
rate under a program in which benefits are offered indefinitely.
In section III.C we calculate optimal replacement rates for sub-
optimal programs -- that is, programs in which benefits are cut off
after a certain length of time. In section IV. A we drop the
assumption that all unemployed workers are eligible for UI, and
show that when UI-ineligibles are added to the model the optimal
replacement rate is likely to increase. In section IV . B we
consider the effects of adding voluntary saving to the model. We
reason that, although including savings would reduce the optimal
replacement rate somewhat, it would not alter our conclusion that
an infinite potential duration of benefits is optimal. Finally,.in
section V we discuss the omission of worker heterogeneity from the
model and offer some conjectures as to how this omission might
6
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results. We also summarize and discuss the
lity of the results.
7
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II. Model and Approach
We follow Baily and Flemming by modeling the behavior of a
representative unemployed worker who is searching for employment.
This worker earns a wage of W while employed and collects UI
benefits of x while unemployed provided that he has not exhausted
his benefits. Benefits are provided by the government to all
jobless workers who have been unemployed for no more thanT
periods. UI is funded by taxing all employed workers' incomes at
a constant rate T.
We assume that unemployed workers choose search effort (p) to
maximize expected lifetime income and that all workers are
infinitely lived. 3 Given total labor demand (F), search effort
determines equilibrium steady-state unemployment (U).4 The
government's goal is to choose x and T to maximize aggregate
expected lifetime income. Increases in x and/or T provide
unemployed workers with additional insurance but these increases
also lower optimal search effort and therefore increase equilibrium
unemployment. The optimal governm~nt policy must balance these two
opposing forces.
Formally, we use L to denote total labor supply and let J
represent the total number of jobs held in the steady-state
equilibrium. Then,. since every worker is either employed or
3 We assume infinite life since it makes the model much more
tractable. Flemming also makes this assumption while Baily uses a
two-period model.
4 Following Baily and Flemming, we do not model the firm and




L = J + U.
later use, we define ~ to be the equilibrium number of workers
have been unemployed for t periods (t = 1, ... ,T) and let Ux
the equilibrium number of unemployed workers who have
exhausted their UI benefits. We then write total unemployment as:
Turn next to the firms. For simplicity, we assume that each
firm provides only one job opportunity.s Thus, F denotes both the
total number of firms and the total number of jobs available at any
time. Each job is either filled or vacant. If we let V denote the
number of vacancies in a steady-state equilibrium, it follows that:
(3) F = J + V.
The remainder of the model is explained in three stages.
First, we describe the dynamics of the labor market and derive the
conditions that must hold in a steady-state equilibrium. These
conditions guarantee that the unemployment rate and the composition
S This assumption is commonly used in general equilibrium
search models (see, for example, Diamond 1982 or Pissarides 1990).
Alternatively, we could simply assume that each firm recruits for
and fills each of its many vacancies separately.
9
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of unemployment both remain constant over time. Second, we relate
search intensity by unemployed workers to their reemployment
probabilities. We then use these reemployment probabilities to
derive the expected lifetime incomes of employed and unemployed
workers. Finally, in stage three, we derive the optimal level of
search effort for all unemployed workers.
To describe the dynamics of the labor market, let s denote the
probability that an employment relationship will break up in any
given period -- that is, the job turnover or separation rate. In
addition, let 11\ and lnx denote the reemployment probabilities for
workers in their ttb period of search and for UI-exhaustees,
respectively. For any given worker, there are T + 2 possible
employment states -- UlI U2 , •••• , UT , Ux' and J. If employed (i. e. ,
if in state J) the worker faces a probability sof losing her job
and moving into state U1 • If unemployed for t periods (i.e., if in
state Ut ), the worker faces a probability of ~ of finding a job and
moving into state J. with the remaining probability of 1 - ·lnt this
worker remains unemployed and moves on to state ~+1. Finally, UI
exhaustees face a reemployment probability of lnx, in which case they
move into state J. Otherwise, they remain in state Ux.
In a steady-state equilibrium the flows into and out of each
state must be equal so that the unemployment rate and its
composition do not change over time. Using the above notation, the
flows into and out of state U1 are equal if:
(4) sJ = Ute
10
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The flows into and out of state Ut (for t = 2, ..• ,T,) are equal if:
Finally, the flows into and out of state Ux are equal if:
In each case, the flow into the state is given on the left-hand-
side of the expression while the flow out of the state is given on
the right-hand-side.
Turn next to the reemployment probabilities. Each unemployed
worker chooses search effort to maximize expected lifetime income.
We use Pt to denote the search effort of a worker who is in her t~
period of search,with Px playing the same role for ur exhaustees.
Search effort is best thought of as the number of firms a worker
chooseS to contact in each period of job search. (For workers who'
contact fewer than one firm on average, Pt could be thought of as
the probability of contacting any firm.) Once a worker contacts a
firm, she files an application for employment if the firms has a
vacancy. Since there are F firms and V of them have vacancies, the
probability of contacting a firm with a vacancy is .V/F. Finally,
once all applications have been filed, each firm with a vacancy
fills that vacancy by choosing randomly from its pool of
applicants. Thus, if N other workers apply to the firm, the
probability of a given worker getting the job is 1/(N+1). Since
11
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each othe~ worker eith~r does or does not apply, N is a random
variable with aPoissondfstribution with parameter A equal to the
average number of applicati~ns filed at· each firm. It is
straightforward to'show;that thi~ implies that the probability of
getting a job offer conditional 'onhaving applied at a firm with a
vacancy is (l/A)( i - e·~]. The reemployment probability for any,
given worker is then the product of these three terms -- the number
of firms contacted, the probability-that a given firm will have a
vacancy, and the probability of getting the job conditional on
having applied at a firm with a vacancy:
for t = 1, ... ,T
where
These equations 'define' the reemployment probabilities of workers as
a function of search'effort and'the length of time that they have
been unemployed (since ll\ varies 'over" time) . Note that for any
given worker, the search effort of other workers affects that
worker's reemployment:probability through A.
Finally, to determine optimal search effort we must first
define expected lifetime income for all workers. Let Vw denote the
12
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) Vw = w(l - 1) + [sVl + (1 - s)Vwl/ (1 + r).
Note that future income is discounted with r denoting the interest
rate.
For unemployed workers, current income is equal to
unemployment insurance (if benefits have not yet been exhausted)
less search costs. We assume that the cost of search is given by
c(p) where c is a convex function with c(O) = O. Future income
depends on future employment status -- with probability 11\ the
worker finds a job and can expect to earn Vw in the future, while
with the remaining probability she remains unemployed and can
expect to earn vt+1 in the future. Thus,
fort= 1 / ••• / T.
( 12 ) Vx = - c (px) + [ DlxVw + (1 - lllx) Vx) / (1 + r) •
. 13
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Unemployed workers choose search effort (Pt) to maximize expected
lifetime income (~). Thus,
(13) Pt = arg max Vt
(14) Px = arg max Vx•
for t = 1, ... , T
This completes the description of the model. structurally it
is very similar to Flemming's model. However, Flemming assumed
that ur benefits are offered indefinitely and therefore, in his
model all unemployed workers are identical. One of our purposes is
to relax the assumption of indefinite benefits. Our model allows
us to capture the notion that unemployed workers who have been
unemployed for a longer period of time will search harder as they
begin to worry about eXhausting their benefits. In addition, as we
show below, once we take into account the fact that UI is not
offered indefinitely, conclusions about optimal U1 levels are
altered drastically.
Before we turn to optimal policy, it is useful' to first
describe the structure of equilibrium and some of its comparative
dynamic properties. It is straightforward to show that the
structure of equilibrium is such that Vw > VI > V2 > ••• > VT > Vx •
That is, expected lifetime income is highest for employed workers,
lowest for unemployed workers who have exhausted their benefits,
and decreasing in the number of weeks that a worker has been
unemployed. Intuitively, workers in the early stages of a spell of
14
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unemployment have more weeks to find a job before they have to
worry about losing their UI benefits. Because of this, workers who
have recently become unemployed will not search as hard as those
who have been unemployed for a longer period of time -- that is,
9ptimal search effort will be increasing in the number of weeks of
unsuccessful search (Pt < P2 < ••• < PT < Px).
A decrease in UI benefits (x) or the potential duration of
benefits (T) decreases the level of insurance offered unemployed
workers and triggers an increase in search effort by all UI-
eligible workers (and therefore lowers equilibrium unemployment).
Either change results in a decrease in Vt for all t. But decreases
I in x and T have opposite effects on the probability of eXhausting
benefits. A decrease in x makes it less likely that a worker will
exhaust her UI benefits before finding a job (since she searches
harder). But a decrease in T makes it more likely that benefits
will be exhausted since the time horizon over which benefits are
offered has been shortened (this is true even though search effort
increases as a result of the decrease in T) .
One final feature of the model needs to be emphasized.
Although we assume that agents act to maximize expected lifetime
income (as opposed to utility), they are in fact risk averse. Risk
aversion follows from the ~ssumption that search costs are convex
in search effort. Any increase in the wage or decrease in UI
benefits triggers an increase in search effort; but since search
costs are convex, optimal search effort is concave in wand x.
This implies that expected lifetime income is concave in wand x,
15
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making the worker risk averse with respect to income. This is
important because it implies that any pOlicy change that reduces
the risk associated with unemployment will be welfare enhancing.
16
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III. Social Welfare and Optimal ur Benefits
In the context of the m'odel outlinedabPYe,Jsocial welfare can
be calculated by aggregating expected lifetime income across all
'Workers. In a steady-state equilibrium there are J employed
workers with expected lifetime incomes of Vw , Ut unemployed workers
who are in their t~ period of search with expected lifetime incomes
of Vt , and Ux unemployed workers who have exhausted their UI
benefits with expected lifetime incomes of Vx • Aggregating yields
Social Welfare (SW):
The government's problem is to choose x (the UI benefit level)
and T (the potential duration of benefits) to maximize (15) with
the tax rate, T, set such that the government bUdget balances:
(16) JWT = x(U - Ux).
As noted above, increases in x or T increase the level of insurance
provided to unemployed workers but also increase equilibrium
unemployment and require that T increase in order to fund the
expanded proqram.
A. Optimal Potential Duration of Benefits
The most straightforward way to determine the optimal UI
program is to proceed in two steps. First, for any tax rate (T),
17
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'we consider the set of all tax neutral programs (so that workers'
incomes are the same while employed under any of the programs). and
determine which one leads to the highest expected lifetime income
for unemployed workers. Two programs are defined to be tax neutral
if they are funded by taxing income at the same rate. It follows
that if two programs are tax neutral, workers' net income while
employed will be' the same under either program. Thus, if one
program leads to a higher ~ for all t and a higher Vx ' it must be
superior to the other program~ This' is in fact the case -- if we
consider two tax neutral programs, the program with the longer
potential duration of benefits (higher T) and the lower level of
benefits (lower x) will lead to larger values of ~ for all t and
a larger value of Vx • Thus, for any given 1, the optimal program
is characterized by T = 00. Setting T = 00 allows us to write the
optimal program for any given 1 as X(1). In the second step, we
then maximize social welfare over X(1) .
To see why it is optimal to set T = 00, consider any program
(x, T) where T is finite. Now, increase the potential duration of
benefits (T) by one period and lower the weekly benefit amount (x)
in a tax neutral manner. What are the affects of this change in
policy? since the change is tax neutral, net income while employed
is unchanged. For the unemployed, there are both direct' and
indirect effects on current income. The direct effect is that
benefits are lower in the first T periods of unemployment but
benefits are now offered for an additional period. The indirect
effect works through search effort. For reasons that will become
18
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clear shortly, the policy change reduces search effort in all
periods of unemployment, thereby lowering search costs. Once we
combine these effects, we are left with three cases to consider
there are periods t = l, ... ,T in which the worker is eligible to
receive UI under either program, there is period T+l in which the
worker receives UI under the new program but not the old program,
and there are periods t = T+2, ..•. in which the worker does not
receive UI benefits under either program. In periods l, ••• ,T, the
direct effect of lowering benefits ~wamps the cost savings from
reduced search effort so that current income falls. In period T+l,
the worker receives benefits under the new program, raising current
income. Finally, in periods T+2 and on, there are no benefits to
lower, so everything depends on the indirect effect -- since search
costs are lower, current income is higher.
This impact of the policy change on current income is depicted
in Figure 1. Current income for the employed is unchanged, it
falls for unemployed workers in the first T periods of search, and
it increases for all unemployed workers who have been searching at
least T+l periods. Thus, this policy change increases income in
the most adverse states of unemployment and lowers it in the least
adverse states of unemployment it smoothes income across
possible states of unemployment. Since the unemployed are risk
averse and since total UI benefits given to the unemployed are the
same under the two programs, this raises the expected lifetime
19
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utility of all unemployed workers. 6
In this model with homogeneous workers, increasing T and
lowering x in a tax neutral manner makes all unemployed workers
better off. Accordingly, their expected lifetime incomes rise (Vt
increases for all t). This is why the pOlicy change lowers search
effort -- since expected lifetime income while unemployed rises,
the opportunity cost of unemployment falls, triggering a decrease
in search effort.
Extending the potential duration of benefits in a tax neutral
way also increases the expected lifetime income for employed
workers (Vw). To see why, consider (10) which defines Vw• Since
the policy change is tax neutral, w(1 - 1) does not change.
However, since the unemployed are better off, Vi rises. Thus, Vw
increases. It follows that the shift in pOlicy makes all agents
better off.
In summary, a tax neutral change in pOlicy that increases the
potential duration of benefits (T) and lowers the weekly benefit
amount ,(x) smoothes the receipt of income over states of
unemployment without lowering the total amount of income received
by the unemployed. since all risk averse agents wish to smooth
consumption, this makes all agents better off.
6 In the terminOlogy of decision making under uncertainty, the
policy change results. in a "Rothschild-stiglitz decrease in risk"
for unemployed workers (see Rothschild and stiglitz, 1970).
20
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B. Optimal Replacement Rates with Unlimited Benefit Duration
We next obtain the optimal UI replacement rate under the
assumption that T -- the potential duration of UI benefits --
equals infinity. Setting T equal to infinity makes sense for two
reasons. First, we found above that it is the optimal policy.
Second, setting T to infinity simplifies the model greatly because
it makes all unemployed workers behave in an identical fashion over
the entire spell of unemployment. Since no worker is getting close
to eXhausting benefits, all earn the same present and future income
and choose the same level of search effort. If the potential
duration of benefits were limited, search intensity would vary over
the spell of unemployment, rising as the exhaustion point neared.
(In the next sUb-section, we obtain the optimal replacement rate
under limited potential duration of UI benefits.)
When T is set to infinity, equations (1) and (3) are
nchanged, while (2) becomasunnecessary. In addition, since we no
longer need to keep track of the composition of unemployment, the
teady-state equations can be simplified. Equations (5) and (6)
an be dropped while (4) needs to be modified. While the flow into
nemployment is still sJ, the flow out of unemployment becomes (1 -
where m represents the reemployment probability for any
nemployed worker. Thus, the new steady-state condition becomes sJ
mUG
The probability of reemployment (m) also becomes simpler to
efine -- it is now defined by (7) with the t sUbscripts on m and
dropped. Equation (8) can be dropped, and the definition of A
21
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simplifies to A = pUfF.
Turn next to expected lifetime income and search effort.
Define Vu to be the expected lifetime income ealned by all
unemployed workers. Then, using the same logic as in section A,
(10) and (11) can be written as:
Vw = w(l - 1) + (sVu + (1 - s)VwJ/(l + r) and,
Vu = x - c(p) + (mVw + (1 - m)VuJ/(l + r).
Optimal search effort (p) is chosen to maximize Vue
Finally, for the government, Social Welfare can now be written
as SW = JVw + UVu while the government bUdget constraint can be
simplified to JW1 = xU. The government's goal is now to choose x
to maximize SW sUbject to its bUdget constraint.
Although this model is far simpler than the one laid out in
section A, it is still too complex to yield a closed form solution
for the optimal value of x. Again following Baily and Flemming, we
choose parameter values and solve the model explicitly for the
optimal x. Assuming that our parameters are chosen wisely, this
should give us some idea of the range in which the optimal level of
benefits falls.
The parameters of the model include the separation rate (s),
the interest rate (r), the wage (w), the total number of jobs
available (F) I the size of the labor force (L), and the search cost
function (c(p». We can obtain an estimate of s from the existing
22
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on labor market dynamics. Ehrenberg (1980) and Murphy
Topel (1987) both provide estimates of the number of jobs that
in each period. If we measure time in 2-week intervals,
work suggests that s lies in' the range of .007 to .013. For
interest rate we set r = .008 which translates into an annual
rate of approximately 20%. Since our previous work
suggests that results from this model are not sensitive to changes
in r over a fairly wide range, this is the only value for the
interest rate that we consider.
For F and L we begin by noting that our model is homogeneous
of degree zero in F and L so that we may set L = 100 without loss
of generality. If we then vary F holding all other parameters
fixed we can solve for the equilibrium unemployment and vacancy
rates. Abraham's (1983) work suggests that the ratio of
unemployment to vacancies (U/V) varies between 1.5 and 3 over the
business cycle. Although the actual values of U and V depend on
the other parameters, we find that to obtain such values for U/V in
our model F must lie in range of 95 to 97.5.
The remaining parameters are the wage rate and the search cost
function. For these values we turn to our previous work, which
makes use of data and results from the Illinois Reemployment Bonus
Experiment (Davidson and Woodbury 1993, 1995). In the Illinois
Reemployment Bonus Experiment a randomly selected group of new
claimants for UI were offered a $500 bonus for accepting a new job
within 11 weeks of filing their initial claim. The average





search cost function that would be consistent with such behavioral
For our reference
In our previous work, we estimated the parameters of the
UI benefit and the optimal replacement rate.
case the optimal replacement rate -- the ratio of bi-weekly UI
7 As we show elsewhere (Davidson and Woodbury 1995), the
Illinois bonus impact suggests that a 10 percentage point increase
in the UI replacement rate lengthens the expected duration of
unemployment by .8 week, and that a 1 week increase in the
potential duration of benefits lengthens the expected duration of
unemployment by .2 week. These are in the upper-middle .of the
range of existing estimates of the disincentive effects of UI.
and z = 1.269. Once we have solved for the optimal value for x in
In summary, our reference case uses the following parameter
infinite potential duration of benefits for the optimal bi-weekly
Table 1 summarizes the results of solving the model with
to test for the sensitivity of our results with respect to each.
the reference case, we vary sand F over the ranges described above
values: s = .010, r = .008, L = 100, F = 96.25, W = 511, c = 282,
elasticity of search costs with respect to search effort. Our
in Illinois ($511), the values of c and z that are consistent with
the Illinois experimental results are c = 282 and z = 1.269. 7
predictions match the outcome observed in the Illinois experiment.
and then solved for the parameters that would make the model's
results indicated that for the average bi-weekly wage rate observed
The functional form that we used was c(p) = cpz, where z denotes the
1991) .
results. That is, we assumed a specific functional form for c(p)
of the randomly selected control group (Davidson and Woodbury
approximately .7 weeks less than the average unemployment duration
benefits to the bi-weekly wage -- is .66. 8 For other values of the
separation rate (s) and total available jobs (F), the optimal
replacement rate varies from a low of .60 to a high of .74. This
range falls between the optimal replacement rate estimates obtained
by Baily (around .50) and Flemming (.75 in a model without
borrowing or lending).
We obtain higher optimal replacement rates when s is low.
Intuitively, when s is low, separations occur infrequently and the
equilibrium unemployment rate is relatively low. with high
employment, the government can afford to provide more generous
assistance to the relatively few who are unemployed without
generating a large tax burden fqr the employed. Also, we obtain
higher optimal replacement rates when Flow.
8 Remarkably, this rate is identical to the rate suggested by
Hamermesh (1977) in his classic study of UI.
25
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c. Optimal Replacement Rates with Limited Benefit Duration
We have argued that the optimal Dr, prqgram entails offering
benefits to unemployed workers indef~nitely. Moreover, with
savings ruled out and an elastibityof search with respect to UI
benefits that is in the upper-middle of the range of existing
estimates,9 we find that the optimaL replacement rate is roughly
two-thirds. This result accords fairly well with some of the
results reported in Baily (1978) and Flemming (1978). Baily finds
an optimal replacement rate of approx.imCjltffly .50 when the
elasticity of search effort with respe,ct to UI benefits is
relatively low. But his optimal repl~cement rp.t~ fp.lls below .50
when this elasticity is high, which is the case he considers most
relevant. In the end, he suggests that replacement rates in the
united states, which designed to be about .50, are too high.
Flemming finds that the optimal replacement rate is roughly .75
when agents cannot borrow or lend (as in our model). But he argues
that when savings are incorporated into the modeL, the optimal
replacement rate falls below .50. Thus" both authors strongly
suggest that the existing UI programs in t~e united states are too
generous.
As emphasized earlier, both Baily and Flemming assume that the
potential duration of ur ben.efits is ~nfinite. Although we have
9 Again, Illinois bonus impact, which was used to calibrate
our model, suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in the ur
replacement rate lengthens the expected duration of unemployment by
.8 week, and that a 1 week increase in the potential duration of






Flemming mainly because Baily and Flemming assume that Dr benefits
are provided in perpetuity, whereas we have examined optimal ur
benefits under finite benefit duration. It is easy to see that the
optimal UI replacement rate could never approach 1 if UI benefits
were offered in perpetuity -- if full income replacement were
offered indefinitely to unemployed workers, the unemployed would
have no incentive to become reemployed and the economy would shut
down. On the other hand, if the government were to offer full
income replacement for only a limited time (say, 26 weeks), the
unemployed would begin searching around the time their benefits
were exhausted. The unemployment rate would not explode and the
economy would not shut down. with full income replacement for 26
weeks, the unemployment rate would increase (to around 10% in our
reference case, compared with 7% with a replacement rate of .5),
but there would be a substantial smoothing of income that would
increase the utility of all risk averse agents.
In summary, the assumption that the potential duration of UI
benefits is unlimited in both the Baily and Flemming models leads
to a basic misinterpretation of their results. Only if the
government follows the optimal pOlicy of offering UI benefits
indefinitely is the optimal replacement rate as low as the values
of .5 and below that Baily and Flemming report. If the potential
duration of UI benefits is limited, then the optimal replacement






Another assumption made by Baily and Flemming is that all
'.
workers are eligible to collect UI benefits. rn reality
this is not the case. Workers with a weak attachment to the labor
force, new labor force entrants, and labor force reentrants are
typically not eligible to collect benefits while unemployed.. Blank
and Card (1991) estimate that in the United states no more than 45%
of the unemployed are Ur-eligible.
consideration of UI-ineligibles in the model can change the
optimal replacement rate for two reasons. First, an increase in
the generosity of the UI system will have a spill-over effect on
the welfare of UI-ineligible workers. In general, a more generous
ur system reduces the search effort of Ur-eligible jobless workers ..
This reduction in search effort makes it easier for UI-ineligibles
to find jobs and increases their expected lifetime utility. Once
we take this spill-over effect into account, the optimal
replacement rate rises.
Second, when we explicitly account for the fact that not all
workers are UI-eligible, the reemployment probability faced by UI-
eligible workers changes. Whether their reemployment prospects are
brightened or dimmed depends on how hard Ur-ineligibles search and
the degree of sUbstitutability in production between UI-eligible
and UI-ineligible workers. For example, suppose that Ur-eligibles
and UI-ineligibles are considered close substitutes by firms and
that uI-ineligibles search harder than Ur-eligibles (since they
29
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receive no ur benefits). rn this case, adding Ur-ineligibles to
the model will lower the reemployment probabilities faced by U1-
eligibles and increase the desirable level of insurance (i.e., the
optimal replacement rate will rise) .
On the other hand, suppose that Ur-ineligibles are low-skilled
workers who do not vie for the same jobs as Ur-eligible workers.
In this case, treating all workers as if they are Ur-eligible will
overstate the difficulty that Ur-eligibles will have in finding a
job (since, in reality, there will be fewer workers vying for the
jobs Ur-eligibles seek than the model predicts). Since the
presence of ur-ineligibles in the model makes it easier for UI-
eligibles to find jobs, the level of insurance that the government
needs to provide to Ur-eligibles falls (i.e., the optimal
replacement rate falls).
To investigate the size of these effects we add Ur-ineligibles
to a model in which the potential duration of benefits is unlimited
and solve for the optimal replacement rate. The fundamental
equations of the model as follows:
(1') L = J + U
(3') F = J + V
(4 ' ) sJq = ~Ui
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v~ = w(l - r) + [s~ + (1 - s)V~]/(l + r)
Pj = arg max Vj
for j = i, e
for j = i, e
sUbscripts e and i refer to UI-eligible and UI-ineligible
workers. Thus, Ue and ~ are the numbers of UI-eligible and UI-
ineligible workers seeking jobs in the steady-state equilibrium.
The only new parameter is q (in equations 4' and 5'), which is the
fraction of the unemployed who are UI-ineligible.
As before, (1')-(3') are simple accounting identities.
Equations (4') and (5') are the new steady-state equations -- (4')
equates the flows into and out of state Ue (UI-eligible
unemployment) while (5') equates the flows into and out of state Uj
(UI-ineligible unemployment). Equation (7') defines the
reemployment probabilities for unemployed workers. Equation (10')-
(12') define expected lifetime income for employed and unemployed
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workers. Note that in each case, a separate definition is provided
for Ur-eligible and Ur-ineligible workers. Finally, (13') defines
optimal search effort.
The government's problem is the same as before, except that
Social Welfare must now include the expected lifetime income of U1-
ineligible workers as well.
rt is important to note that in the above model the only
difference between Ur-eligible and Ur-ineligible workers is that
the Ur-eligibles receive benefits while unemployed. That is, in
this model firms consider the two types of workers good substitutes
in production, and in equilibrium Ur-ineligibles search harder than
Ur-eligibles (since Ur-ineligibles receive no benefits).
An alternative to assuming that Ur-eligibles and U1-
ineligibles are good substitutes who compete for the same jobs is
to assume that they are poor substitutes. We accomplish this by
assigning Ur-ineligibles a low reemployment probability that is
unaffected by the behavior of Ur-eligibles. That is, we replace
(13') for j = i with:
(14) Pi = {3
where {3 takes some low value. Assigning a low reemployment
probability to UI-ineligibles captures the notion that UI-
ineligibles do not compete for the same jobs as Ur-eligibles
that is, they are poor substitutes for Ur-eligibles.
We solve the model under the two alternative assumptions about
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lity between Ur-eligibles and Ur-ineligible and compare
results. Table 2 shows the optimal replacement rate under
assumptions about turnover (s) and the total number of jobs
lable (F), and assuming that Ur-ineligibles and Ur-eligibles
are close substitutes. The only new parameter in the model is q,
the proportion of unemployed workers who are Ur-ineligible. Based
on Blank and Card (1991), we consider q = .6 the most likely case,
but report the optimal replacement rate for other values of q for
comparison.
Table 2 shows that accounting for the fact that some workers
are ineligible for ur increases the optimal replacement rate. rn
our reference case the optimal replacement rate rises from .66 when
there are no Ur-ineligibles to .74 when 60% of the unemployed are
Ur-ineligible. The optimal replacement rate also increases with q
for the other cases considered in Table 2. Thus, assuming that all
workers are eligible for ur (as we did above and as Baily and
Flemming did) tends to bias downward estimates of the optimal
replacement rate.
The intuition behind this result was described above. rf all
workers are assumed to be Ur-eligible, the model cannot take into
account the positive spill-over effect of ur on Ur-ineligibles
(that is, ur benefits improve the well-being of Ur-ineligibles).
Also, the model will overstate the reemployment prospects of UI-
eligibles unless Ur-eligibles and Ur-ineligibles are very poor
substitutes in production. Accounting for either of these effects
results in a higher optimal replacement rate.
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Consider now the case in which UI-eligible and UI-ineligible
workers are not close substitutes. To solve for the optimal
replacement rate in this case w~ need to choose a value for ~, the
search effort of UI-ineligibles. As {3 falls, the reemployment
prospects of UI-eligibles brighten and less insurance is needed
that is, as ~ falls, the optimal replacement rate falls. If {3 is
low enough, adding UI-ineligibles to the model could actually lower
the optimal replacement rate. That is, ~he positive effect of a
low {3 on UI-eligible reemployment probabilities could outweigh the
spill-over effect of UI on the well-being of UI~ineligibles.
The question now is, how Iowa value of {3 would be needed to
leave the optimal replacement rate equal to what it would be in a
model in which all workers are UI-eligible? For each of the cases
shown in Table 2, we solve the model for the value of ~ that For
all of the cases we have checked, the result is that P would have
to be approximately 15% of the value that it would have been in the
first model -- that is, in order for the optimal replacement rate
to remain constant when UI-ineligibles ,are added to the model, UI-
ineligibles would have to face a reemployment probability .that is
roughly 85% lower than the reemployment probability they face in
the model in which UI-eligibles and UI-ineliqiblesare close
substitutes. Thus, the degree of sUbstitutability between UI-
eligibles and UI-ineligibles would have to be extremely low for the





In our model workers are not allowed to save. This biases our
0iT the optimal replac~ment rate upwards since agents
self-insure against unemployment by saving during periods of
Extending our model to allow for savings is not
-- we would have to choose a specific form for the
ity functionj model the capital market, and recalibrate the
to obtain estimates of the search cost parameters.
Fortunately, we can say something about the effect of extending our
model to include saving without actually going through the
First, it should be clear that our basic result -- that
the optimal potential duration toUI benefits is infinite -- would
continue to hold even in a model where workers could save. Unless
capital markets were perfect, agents would never save enough while
employed to fully smooth consumption across periods of
unemployment. 10 ThUS, the qualitative nature of Figure 1 would
continue to hold with savings in the model -- the vertical axis can
simply be relabeled" '''present consumption." Extending benefits in
a tax neutral manner will lower present consumption in the "good"
states of unemployment ('when present consumption is relatively
high) and increase it in,themost adverse states. It follows that
it will still be optimal to offer UI indefinitely.
Second,sinc'e it is optimal to offer UI benefits indefinitely,
and since Baily and Flemming allowed for savings in their models,
10 As noted in the introduction, the empirical evidence is




we can refer to their work to gauge how our results might be
altered by allowing workers to save. Consider first Baily's
findings. In a two-period model in which agents can save in the
first period of life, he finds that the optimal replacement rate
falls between .33 and .50, depending on the elasticity of search
effort with respect to UI. l1 If the elasticity is low, the optimal
replacement rate is close to .50. If the elasticity is high, the
optimal replacement rate falls to .33. 12 Our results suggest that
if Baily were to include UI-ineligibles in his model, his optimal
replacement rates would rise by about 8 to 10 percentage points.
Thus, combining our results with Baily's suggests that if workers
can save, the optimal replacement rate will lie somewhere between
.40 and .60. This rate is optimal, however, only if the potential
duration of UI benefits is infinite.
Consider next Flemming's results. Flemming develops a model
with infinitely lived agents and allows for varying degrees of
capital market imperfections. If agents cannot borrow or lend, his
model yields an optimal replacement rate of around .70. If capital
markets are perfect, the optimal replacement rate lies in the range
of .10 to .20. 13 Our results suggest that adding UI-ineligibles to
11 Baily makes a reasonable assumption about the degree of
risk aversion specifically, that all agents have the same
constant value of absolute risk aversion, and that this value is
one.
12 See his Table 2, column 2, rows 2 and 3.




Flemming's model would boost these rates by about 8 to 10
percentage points, yielding a range of .25 to .80 for the optimal
replacement rate. However, we can probably rule out the extreme
values since they are based on extreme assumptions capital
markets do exist, but they are not perfect. This leaves us with
optimal replacement rates quite similar to those discussed in the
previous paragraph -- that is, .40 to .60. Again, it is important
to emphasize that these rates are optimal only if the potential
duration of ur benefits is infinite.
We conclude that if workers are allowed to save during periods
of employment, the optimal replacement rate falls to a level that
is consistent with existing average statutory rates in the United
states. Hence, the current level of ur benefits would appear to be
about right if the potential duration of benefits were infinite.
But the current potential duration of benefits -- 26 weeks in most
states in nonrecessionary times -- appears to be too short.
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v. Discussion, Caveats, and Conclusions
Our results suggest that the structure of the existing Dr
system in the United states is sUb-optimal. Most existing state
systems limit the potential duration of DI benefits to 6 months,
whereas insurance considerations suggest that it would be better to
provide an unlimited potential duration of benefits (see section
III.A). Also, most states' UI systems pay replacement rates on the
order of .5 to most workers. But only when the potential duration
of benefits is unlimited are DI replacement rates even as low as
two-thirds optimal {section III. B). When the potential duration of
benefit is limited to 32 weeks or less, insurance considerations
suggest that an optimal replacement rate of 1 would be optimal
(section III.C).
A likely objection to the finding that an infinite potential
duration of benefits is optimal is that, if benefits were
inexhaustible, then workers would never return to work. It is true
that increasing the potential duratiQn of benef its would lead
workers to remain unemployed longer and would lead to a higher
unemployment rate. In our model, increasing the potential duration
of UI benefits from 6 months to infinity with a DI replacement rate
of .5 would raise the unemployment rate from 7% to 10% (see section
III.C). Raising the replacement rate to 1 (from existing levels
around .5) would,similarly, increase the length of unemployment
spells and increase the unemployment rate. But a higher
unemployment rate is not a shut-down of the economy workers
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not collect UI benefits paying a replacement rate of .5 (or
Moreover, the increase in the unemployment rate
result from voluntary behavior, not from economic hard times,
would connote an improvement in workers' well-being. w
The model used to derive these conclusions is set· out in
II, and extends earlier work by Baily (1978) and Flemming
in two ways. First, whereas Baily and Flemming assumed that
benefits are offered indefinitely, we consider a UI system in
the potential duration of benefits is limited to 26 weeks, as
states. We find that the optimal U~ replacement rate
such a system is 1, rather than .75 or less, as Baily and
suggested (see sections III.C).
we consider how the optimal UI replacement rate is
by the presence of workers who are ineligible for UI
(section IV.A). This is important because fewer than half of all
unemployed workers in the united states are UI-eligible. Adding
UI-ineligibles to the model has two effects. The first is a
positive spill-over effect that increases the optimal UI
replacement rate: Since UI benefits reduce the search intensity of
UI-eligible workers, UI-ineligibles face less competition for jobs
when UI benefits are higher. The second concerns the
SUbstitutability in production between UI-eligible and ineligible
workers. If UI-eligibles and UI-ineligibles are substitutes, then
the presence of UI-ineligibles makes it harder for UI-eligibles to
14 Increased unemployment, when it is in part increased in
leisure, is hardly a bad thing. This point is made in an unusually
entertaining way by Landsburg (1993).
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find reemployment. (UI-ineligibles presumably search harder than
UI-ineligibles because they receive no UI benefits.) Ignoring the
presence of Ur-ineligibles leads to an overstatement of the
reemployment prospects for UI-eligible workers, and the optimal UI
replacement rate needs to be increase to compensate. In general,
then, the presence of UI-ineligibles in the workforce increases the
optimal replacement rate. 15
In section IV.B we consider the effects of adding voluntary
saving to the model. If workers are able to save, then the optimal
replacement rate falls by about 10 percentage points (for example,
from .6 tp .5). But allowing workers to save would not alter our
conclusion that an infinite potential duration of benefits is
optimal.
In the model developed in section II, we assume that UI-
eligible workers are homogeneous, that the disincentive effects of
UI benefits are in the upper-middle of the range of effects that
have been estimated, and that workers are unable to save. [Is
there any way of saying something about the degree of risk
aversion?] We have argued that the results are not especially
sensitive to the savings assumption -- in particular, the finding
that the optimal duration of UI benefits is unlimited holds even if
15 We also consider the case in which UI-ineligibles are
lower-skilled workers who are poor substitutes for UI-eligible
'workers. In this case, the presence of UI-ineligibles in the
workforce lowers the optimal replacement rate (i. e., less insurance
is needed). Nevertheless, unless the degree of substitutability
between UI-eligibles and Ur-ineligibles is extremely low, the




are allowed (section IV.A). Also, we believe that the
about the disincentive effects of UI are reasonable and
However, we have not investigated whether results
sensitive to the assumption of worker homogeneity.
Worker heterogeneity could be considered in a number of ways.
approach would be to suppose that some UI-eligible workers face
probability of layoff with a low expected duration of
(blue-collar production workers), while others might
a longer expected duration of
(white-collar non-production workers). Another
might be to suppose that some UI-eligible workers are
attached to the labor force (as most appear to be), but
a significant minority are weakly attached to the labor force.
an unlimited potential duration of benefits would remain
in a model that accounts for one or both of these types of
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ment rate
)=.010;
total jobs available (F) = 96.25; labor force (L) = 100; bi-weekly interest rate = .008;
bi-weekly reemployment wage = $500; search cost parameter (c) = 282;z = 1.269.
Table 1
Optimal Unemployment Insurance Benefits and Replacement Rates
under Various Assumptions,
Model with Infinite Potential Duration of UI Benefits




(s = .010, F = 96.25)
Low turnover
380 .74
(s = .007, F = 96.25)
High turnover
305 .60
(s = .013, F = 96.25)
Fewer total jobs available
356 .70
(s=.010, F=95)
More total jobs available
317 .62
(s=.010, F=97.5)




Optimal UI Replacement Rates When Some Workers
Are Ineligible for UI, Various Assumptions,
Model with Infinite Potential Duration of UI Benefits
Proportion of unemployed workers ineligible for UI (q)
0 .15 .30 .45 .60
Reference case
.66 .67 .69 .72 .74(s = .010, F= 96.25)
Low turnover .74 .75 .77 .79 .81(s = .007, F = 96.25)
High turnover
.60 .62 .64 .67 .70
(s = .013, F = 96.25)
Fewer total jobs available
.70 .71 .73 .75 .77
(s=.010, F=95)
More total jobs available
.62 .64 .66 .69 .72
(s='.010, F=97.5)
Notes: See Table 1. The results shown are from a model in which UI-eligibles and
UI-ineligibles are good substitutes. Optimal replacement rates can fall below those
shown in the table if UI-eligibles and UI-ineligibles are sufficiently poor substitutes.
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